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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE AND LOCAL
AUTHORITY TO IMPLEMENT MINORITY
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE SET-ASIDE UPHELD:
SOUTH FLORIDA CHAPTER OF THE
ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF
AMERICA, INC. V. METROPOLITAN DADE
COUNTY, FLORIDA
Congress passed the Public Works Employment Act of 19771 to
remedy the present economic effects of past racial discrimination in the
construction industry.2 More recently, state and local legislatures have
enacted programs designed to address the same concern. The purpose4
of these race-conscious government programs is to increase minority
business enterprise (MBE)5 participation in the national economy.
I. The Public Works Employment Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-28, 81 Stat. 116
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6701 (1982)) amended the Local Public Works Capital Devel-
opment and Investment Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-369, 90 Stat. 999 (codified at 42
U.S.C. 6701 (1984)) to provide federal funds for minority businesses. Representative
Mitchell, the Bill's sponsor, noted that only one percent of the funds designated for
federal contracts went to minority businesses. 123 CoNG. REC. 5327 (1977) (remarks of
Rep. Mitchell). For a discussion of the legislative history of the 1977 Act, see generally
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 456-73 91980); Construction Ass'n of W. Pa. v.
Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936, 939-42 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1978);
Levinson, A Study of Preferential Treatment: The Evolution of Minority Business Enter-
prise Programs, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 61 (1980); Note, The Public Works Employ-
ment Act of 1977 and Minority Contracting, 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 121 (1978).
2. See generally Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448 (Congress ear-marked 10% of the federal
funds for local public works contracts for minority-owned contractors); Comment, Ful-
liove and the Minority Set-Aside: In Search of an Affirmative Action Rationale, 29 EM-
ORY L.J. 1127 (1980). See also Comment, Minority Construction Contractors, 12 HARV.
C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 673, 693 (1977).
3. See, e.g., Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983) (uphold-
ing Ohio statute requiring state officials to set aside a specified percentage of govern-
ment contracts for bidding by minority business enterprises only).
4. See 123 CONG. REC. 7156 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Brooke) (high chronic unem-
ployment among minorities and the scarcity of minority-owned businesses demand this
race-conscious legislation).
5. A minority business enterprise (MBE) is a business owned or controlled by one
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Such affirmative action programs6 involve setting aside a specific per-
centage of government contracts for MBEs.7 In South Florida Chapter
of the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Dade County, Florida,' the Eleventh Circuit held that a county ordi-
nance limiting competition for specified county contracts to MBEs did
not violate the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion.9 In South Florida, a coalition of white contractors and subcon-
tractors ° sought declaratory and injunctive relief I from a Dade
County Ordinance" designed to aid black-owned businesses. The or-
or more minorities, including women. For the purposes of the 1977 Act, an "owned
and controlled" business means a minority or woman owns at least 51% of the enter-
prise or, in the case of a publicly-owned business, a minority or woman holds at least
51% of the stock. Additionally, one or more minority or woman must control the daily
management of the business. 49 C.F.R. § 23.5 (1984). Minorities are United States
citizens who are Blacks, Hispanics, Asian-Americans, American Indians, Eskimos, and
Aleuts. 123 CONG. REC. 5098 (1977) (Rep. Mitchell).
6. In general, affirmative action programs employ racial classifications and numeri-
cal goals to remedy the effects of past discrimination by facilitating minority group
participation in private and government-sponsored programs. See, e.g., Note, Minority
Business Enterprise Set-Aside: The Reverse Discrimination Challenge, 45 ALB. L. REV.
1139, 1140 n.3 (1981). See also N. GLAZER, AFFIRMATIVE DISCRIMINATION: ETHNIC
INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC POLICY (1975).
7. Sponsors of the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 argued that the desire for
competitive bidding between the relatively new minority-owned businesses and older,
more established companies mandated federal set-aside programs. 123 CONG. REC.
5327 (1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell).
8. 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 220 (1984).
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
10. South Florida Chapter of the Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Am., Inc. v. Metro-
politan Dade County, Florida, 552 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Fla. 1982). The following three
groups joined as plaintiffs: South Florida Chapter of the Associated Contractors of
America, Inc., Engineering Contractors Association of South Florida, Inc., and Air
Conditioning, Refrigeration, Heating and Piping Association, Inc.
Each group is a nonprofit corporation organized in Dade County, Florida, to repre-
sent the interest of its members, many of whom regularly receive Dade County con-
struction contracts. Id.
11. 723 F.2d at 849. The plaintiffs pleaded as an action seeking relief pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1343(a)(14) (1982).
12. Dade County, Fla., Ordinance No. 82-67 (July 20, 1982) implements the policy
the Board of County Commissioners adopted to increase black participation in the
economy.
The Ordinance has an extensive history. The May 1980 Liberty City riots convinced
Dade County officials to examine the economic opportunities of black businesses in the
area. The consultants and committees investigating the problem concluded that black
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dinance contains a set-aside provision13 that reserves a specific number
of contracts for competition solely among black-owned businesses, and
a goals provision 4 that apportions a predetermined dollar amount of
selected contracts to black-owned subcontractors.'
5
business development in Dade County lagged far behind white and hispanic business, as
well as that of blacks in many major American cities. Consequently, the reports urged
the establishment of affirmative action programs. See 552 F. Supp. at 915-16.
Acknowledging these findings, the Dade County Commission adopted a resolution
noting that past discrimination adversely affected the competitive position of black busi-
nesses. Resulting was a "statistically significant disparity between the county's black
population, and both the number of black businesses within the County and those re-
ceiving county contracts." Id. at 916. When the plaintiffs filed this suit, the Census
Bureau estimated Dade County's black population to be 17.2%. MBE's constituted 1%
of Dade County's business. The County awarded only 2% of the contracts (3.7% of the
funds appropriated) to black-owned businesses. Id. at 914.
The resolution concluded that "Dade County has a compelling interest in promoting
a sense of economic equality for all residents of the County" by "stimulating the black
business community, which ... is not likely to benefit significantly in the absence of
specific measures to increase its participation in county business." Id. at 916 (citing
Resolution No. R-1672-81).
The Board of County Commissioners then adopted a policy aimed at establishing
programs to increase black participation in the County's economy. 552 F. Supp. at 916.
The Commission enacted Ordinance No. 82-67 to implement that policy. Id. at 919.
13 The Ordinance stipulated the following set-aside requirements:
Set-asides may only be utilized where prior to invitation for bid, it is determined
that there are sufficient licensed Black contractors to afford effective competition
for the contract. In each contract where set-asides are recommended, staff shall
submit its recommendation and the basis therefor to the Board for its initial review
and determination whether waiver of competitive bidding for such contract is in
the best interest of the County.
Id. at 921 (Dade County, Fla., Ordinance No. 82-67, § 10-38(d)(2) (July 20, 1982)).
14. Id. (Dade County, Fla. Ordinance No. 82-67, § 10-38(d)(1) (July 20, 1982)).
The goal is based on the demand for subcontractors and the supply of black contractors.
15. Under the ordinance, the county issued a notice opening the Earlington Heights
Station (part of a billion dollar rapid transit system financed with federal, state, and
local funds) for bidding solely among black-owned contractors, with a 50% goal for
black-owned subcontractors. 552 F. Supp. at 917-18, 923. The Earlington Heights Sta-
tion, located in a black community, was the last of 20 stations originally planned for the
Metrorail System. The county manager proposed a review of the Earlington Heights
Station under the following administrative procedures stipulated in the Ordinance:
first, each county public works department submits its recommendations for black set-
asides and goals on each construction project in its field; second, a contract review com-
mittee reviews each department's recommendations and then submits a final recommen-
dation on black set-asides and goals to the county commission for final action; third,
prior to implementing a black set-aside program, the Board of County Commissioners
must conclude the proposed set-aside program is "in the best interest of the County"
and worth waiving formal bid procedures. Id. at 922.
Following their study, the contract review committee recommended that the County
Commission waive formal competitive bidding, and set aside the Earlington Heights
1985]
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Plaintiffs alleged that this race-conscious plan violated both Dade
County's Home Rule Charter 6 and the fourteenth amendment's equal
protection clause.' 7 The district court applied strict judicial scrutinyI8
contract for competitive bidding solely among black contractors. The committee also
suggested a 50% black subcontractor participation goal. Id. at 923.
The Dade County Commission passed Resolution R-1350-82, which adopted the
Committee's proposal and mandated that the 100% set-aside for the contract and 50%
subcontractor goal provision apply to the Earlington Heights Station. Id. at 924 (Dade
County, Fla., Res. R-1350-82 (1982)).
16. DADE COUNTY, FLA., Section 4.03(D) Home Rule Charter provides:
Contracts for public improvements and purchases of supplies, materials, and serv-
ices other than professional shall be made whenever practical on the basis of speci-
fications and competitive bids. Formal sealed bids shall be secured for all such
contracts and purchases.... The Board [of County Commissioners], upon recom-
mendation of the Manager, may by resolution adopted by two-thirds vote of the
members present, waive competitive bidding when it finds this to be in the best
interest of the county.
Id.
Plaintiffs contended the ordinance's waiver of formal competitive bidding procedures
violated the Dade County Home Rule Charter. Metropolitan Dade County possesses
special home rule powers. See FLA. CONsT. art. VIII § 6. Pursuant to this constitu-
tional provision, the citizens of Dade County employed a Home Rule Charter that enu-
merates several unique municipal powers. 552 F. Supp. at 927 n.17. See also FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 125.01 (West Supp. 1985).
17. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. Because affirmative action programs
favor minority groups, the majority claims they unjustly discriminate in reverse. See
Note, Minority Business Enterprise Set-Aside, supra note 6, at 1141.
18. Government actions creating classifications based on race are suspect, therefore
subject to "strict" judicial scrutiny, and will fail unless necessary to achieve a compel-
ling governmental interest. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (dispro-
portionate impact of the law fell on minority citizens); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (antimiscegenation statutes violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (application of a facially neutral
statute that burdens one race negates the statute's validity).
Professor Gunther characterizes strict scrutiny as "'strict' in theory but 'fatal' in
fact." See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 8 (1972). Only once has the Supreme Court sustained racial discrimination
after applying strict scrutiny. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (the
Court upheld a military order excluding Japanese-Americans from specified West Coast
areas following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 1000-02 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L. TRIBE].
Equal protection analysis involves two levels of review in addition to strict scrutiny-
rational basis and intermediate level scrutiny. The rational basis test requires only a
rational relation between the classification and the government's objectives. The test,
which applies to economic regulations, results in judicial deference to the legislature.
See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976) (economic regulations are
rationally related to goals of legislature). Courts invoke intermediate level scrutiny
most often in cases involving sex-based classifications. To survive a constitutional at-
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to the ordinance and upheld its "goals" provision but rejected the set-
aside provision. 19 The court of appeals, modifying the lower court's
decision, held the entire ordinance constitutional both on its face and
as applied to the particular construction project.20
Only twice has the Supreme Court ruled on the merits in cases in-
volving equal protection challenges to race-conscious remedial govern-
ment programs. 2' The Court first addressed the constitutionality of an
affirmative action program in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.22 In Bakke, a fragmented Court rejected the university's special
tack, such a classification must bear a substantial relation to an important governmental
interest. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex-based classification used to
determine statutory drinking age not substantially related to important governmental
interest).
19. 552 F. Supp. at 933-43. The district court found the goals provision valid be-
cause it was reasonably related to the objective of increasing black participation in
county construction contracts. Id. at 939. The court struck the set-aside provision,
however, asserting that the means were inappropriate to serve the "compelling govern-
mental interest of remedying the present effects of past identified discrimination." Id. at
935. The court examined several factors in reaching its conclusion: first, the court ar-
gued that there were alternative, less intrusive means under which the county could
achieve its compelling interest, for example, county assistance to black contractors in
preparing bids. See id. at 935-36. Second, the court observed that the ordinance failed
to specify a durational limit and therefore might extend beyond the achievement of its
objectives. Id. at 936. Third, the Court found an unreasonably high correlation be-
tween the number of black workers hired under the ordinance and the percentage of
blacks in the population. Id. at 936-37. Fourth, the court pointed out that the ordi-
nance failed to provide a waiver procedure which enables aggressive white contractors
to be excluded from the set-aside provision. Id. at 937-38. Last, the court noted that
the set-aside program adversely affected third parties, for example, white contractors,
solely because of race. Id. at 938.
20. 723 F.2d at 851-52. The court of appeals adopted an approach similar to that
announced by Chief Justice Burger in Fulliiove. See infra notes 41-49 and the accompa-
nying text. Instead of invoking one of the three levels of scrutiny, the appellate court
balanced the goal of remedying past discrimination with the concern that the means
chosen be narrowly tailored to achieving the legislative purpose. Compare Fullilove, 448
U.S. at 490.
21. The Court also has granted certiorari to three cases in which it did not rule on
the ments. See Boston Firefighters Union Local 718 v. Boston Chapter, NAACP, 461
U.S. 477 (1983) (vacated and remanded judgment of court of appeals for consideration
of mootness in light of legislation enacted since the appellate court's decision); Minnick
v. California Dept. of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105 (1981) (recent developments in the law
and ambiguities in the record regarding the extent to which race is a factor in promo-
tion decisions preclude a hearing on the merits); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974) (equal protection issue in law school admissions program held moot because
school permitted petitioner to complete law school regardless of the Court's ruling).
22. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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admissions program, but upheld the state's right to consider race as a
factor in admissions decisions.23
Writing for the Court, but speaking only for himself, Justice Powell
rejected the university's claim that remedial classifications which bene-
fit minorities are not suspect.24 Justice Powell applied strict scrutiny25
and found the university's admissions program was not necessary to
23. Id. The University of California-Davis Medical School, using a special admis-
sions procedure, reserved 16 out of 100 places in each entering class for minority stu-
dents. The university twice rejected Allan Bakke's admissions application. Bakke,
whose admission scores exceeded those of some students admitted under the special
program, claimed that the admissions program violated the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause as well as Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
The nine Justices wrote six separate opinions and failed to agree on a majority view.
Four Justices upheld the constitutionality of the admissions policy. Bakke, 438 U.S. at
324 (opinion of Brennan, J., joined by White, J., Marshall, J., and Blackmun, J.). Four
other Justices did not address the constitutional issue because they found the plan vio-
lated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 408 (opinion of Stevens, J., joined
by Burger, C.J., Stewart, J., and Rehnquist, J.). Justice Powell, in a separate opinion,
held the Davis plan unconstitutional, but approved the consideration of race as a factor
in admissions decisions. Id. at 288. Thus, Powell's opinion combined with the Stevens
quartet to hold the plan unconstitutional, yet combined with the Brennan quartet to
approve the university's power to consider race as a factor in admission decisions.
24. Id. at 294. By setting aside 16 special seats, the university's admissions program
preferred certain minority students at the expense of white students, who were pre-
vented from competing for the designated seats. Such foreclosure excluded some white
students from a state-provided benefit they might otherwise enjoy. Classifications that
deny certain groups benefits that others receive solely because of race are suspect. Id. at
305. Cf. McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education, 339 U.S. 637,
641-42 (1950) (after admitting a student to a state graduate school, a state cannot treat
him differently from other students solely because of his race).
25. 438 U.S. at 290. Justice Stone first articulated the underlying theory for apply-
ing strict scrutiny to racial classifications in a footnote in United States v. Carolene
Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938):
[L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be ex-
pected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation [may] be subjected to more
exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment than are most other types of legislation. [Citing cases on restrictions on vot-
ing, speech, assembly] ... [S]imilar considerations [may] enter into the review of
statutes directed at particular religions, ... or national.... or racial minorities....
[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily
to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry ....
Id. See L. TRIBE, supra note 18, at 1001. See also Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)
("[AIII legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are imme-
diately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.")
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achieve the stated objectives. 26 A court applying strict scrutiny will
hold a race-classification scheme constitutional only if the classification
is "necessary" to accomplish a "compelling" interest.' In Bakke, Jus-
tices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, 21 however, advocated
an intermediate level of scrutiny. 29 Under this middle level approach,
the governmental action is constitutional if the classification is "sub-
stantially related" to achieving "important" governmental objectives.30
Although Justice Powell and the Brennan quartet disagreed on the
level of scrutiny to apply, they did agree that Bakke affirmed the con-
26. 438 U.S. at 306. The objectives of the university's admissions program were:
(1) to reverse the historic deficit of minorities in medical school and in the medical
profession; (2) to remedy the effects of societal discrimination; (3) to increase the
number of physicians practicing in underserved areas; and (4) to promote educational
benefits that flow from a diverse student body. Id.
27. 438 U.S. at 305. See, eg., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (racial
classifications are suspect only if they are predicated on a racially discriminatory in-
tent); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972) (once the plaintiff establishes
discriminatory intent, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must prove that the same
result would have been reached absent discriminatory intent).
28. 438 U.S. at 357-62 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
29. See generally Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (sex-based classifications must
be substantially related to important governmental interests). The Burger Court
adopted intermediate level scrutiny as an alternative to the rational basis and strict
scrutiny standards instituted by the Warren Court. A court applies intermediate scru-
tiny when important but not fundamental interests are at stake, and when sensitive but
not suspect classifications are involved. See, e.g., Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762
(1977) (intermediate level of scrutiny applied to strike down statute prohibiting illegiti-
mate children from inheriting from their fathers by intestate succession). Courts use
this middle level test most frequently in sex discrimination cases. See, e.g., Craig v.
Boren, supra. A majority of the Court, however, has never applied it in reverse discrim-
ination cases. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359 (opinion of Brennan, White, Marshall, and
Blackmun, J.J.); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (opinion of Marshall, Bren-
nan and Blackmun, J.J.). See generally Minority Business Enterprise Set-Asides, supra
note 6, at 1146-48; L. TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1082-83.
30. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 359. The terms "substantially related" and "important
governmental objective" identifying the intermediate level of review. This standard falls
between the rational basis and strict scrutiny tests. See, e.g., Note, Minority Business
Enterprise Set-Aside, supra note 6, at 1147 n.35. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 19,
at 1082-83.
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun found that state's have a legitimate
interest in eliminating the present effects of past racial discrimination. Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 362. Thus, the university's plan passed muster under the intermediate level of scru-
tiny they advocated. See generally Choper, The Constitutionality of Affirmative Action:
Views from the Supreme Court, 70 KY. L.J. 1, 2 (1981).
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stitutionality of state governmental efforts to achieve equality."1 The
Brennan group stressed that Bakke is important because it allows gov-
ernments to consider race when remedying the effects of past discrimi-
nation.3 2 Courts interpreting congressional legislation designed to
rectify the present effects of past discrimination support the conclusion
that states may also adopt race-conscious programs designed to in-
crease minority participation in the economy.33 The Brennan group
reasoned that if Congress can enact race-conscious remedial legislation
under section five of the fourteenth amendment, then the states can
enact similar regulations pursuant to section one of the fourteenth
amendment.34 The fourteenth amendment permits states to employ
race-conscious programs designed to rectify the effects of racial dis-
crimination 35 because such programs strive for equal opportunity.
The Court next confronted the affirmative action issue in Fulliove v.
Klutznick.36 In Fullilove, a group of white contractors and subcontrac-
tors sued to enjoin enforcement of the MBE provision of the Public
31. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.); 438 U.S. at 324 (opinion of
Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J.).
32. Id. at 325. Justice Brennan distinguished remedial governmental actions from
legislation that demeans or insults minorities. Justice Brennan then added that the abil-
ity to enact race-conscious programs exists when an appropriate legislative, judicial, or
administrative body finds past discrimination. Id. at 325. Justice Powell also stressed
that the appropriate governmental body must conclude past discrimination existed, but
he stated that the university lacked the authority to make such a finding. Id. at 309-10.
33. Id. at 363. See International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. 324 (1977) (retroactive seniority system may be awarded as relief from discrimina-
tory hiring practices). See also Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747
(1976) (identifiable applicants who were denied employment because of race are eligible
for retroactive seniority status); North Carolina State Bd. of Education v. Swann, 402
U.S. 43 (1971) (state statutes may not prohibit involuntary busing). The Brennan group
in Bakke noted that Teamsters and Franks imply that affirmative race-conscious pro-
grams comport with the equal protection clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments. 438 U.S. at 368. Justice Brennan and his colleagues interpreted Teamsters and
Franks as recognizing Congress' power to prescribe preferential treatment for racial
minorities to rectify past discrimination.
34. 438 U.S. at 368. See supra note 9 (text of fourteenth amendment).
35. 438 U.S. at 368. The Brennan quartet emphasized that a contrary interpreta-
tion of the fourteenth amendment conflicts with the notion of a state's competence to
enact regulations consistent with federal policy, absent congressional preemption of the
field. Id. Justice Brennan observed that "[t]o use the Fourteenth Amendment as a
sword against such State power would stultify the Amendment." (quoting Railway
Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 98 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
36. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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Works Employment Act of 1977.37 In another plurality opinion, 8 the
Supreme Court upheld the MBE set-aside as an appropriate exercise of
congressional power to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination.3 9
In Fullilove, the Court provided three approaches to analyzing equal
protection attacks on affirmative action programs." Chief Justice Bur-
ger ignored the tests usually employed in equal protection challenges -
the strict scrutiny, intermediate-level scrutiny and mere rationality
tests. 1 Instead, the Chief Justice developed a two-step analysis. First,
he questioned Congress' ability to meet the program's objectives. Sec-
ond, he examined the constitutionality of the means Congress selected
to achieve the program's objectives.42
Following an extensive review of the Act's legislative history,43 Chief
Justice Burger concluded that the legislation's objective was to remedy
the present effects of past discrimination." Chief Justice Burger found
that Congress properly invoked several constitutionally enumerated
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f(2) (1982). The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve a split among the circuits on the issue of the constitutionality of MBE set-asides.
Compare Constructors Assn. of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1978) (constitu-
tionality of MBE set-aside upheld on the grounds that the plan met a compelling state
interest) and R.I. Chapter, Ass. Gen. Contractors of America, Inc. v. Kreps, 450 F.
Supp. 338 (D.R.I. 1978) (MBE set-aside upheld because it was narrowly tailored in
accordance with its goals of remedying past discrimination) with Ass. Gen. Contractors
of Cal. v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (C.D. Cal. 1977), vacated and
remanded, 438 U.S. 909 (1978), aff'd on remand, 459 F. Supp. 766 (C.D. Cal. 1978)
(MBE set-aside which creates a racial classification rather than providing a remedy for
past discrimination violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
See generally Comment, Fullilove and the Minority Set-Aside: In Search of an Affirma-
tive Action Rationale, 29 EMORY L.J. 1127, 1150-57 (1980).
38. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, delivered an opinion in which Jus-
tices White and Powell joined. 448 U.S. at 453-95. Justice Powell filed a concurring
opinion. Id. at 495-517. Justice Marshall filed a concurring opinion in which Justices
Brennan and Blackmun joined. Id. at 517-22. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion
in which Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 522-32. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opin-
ion. Id. at 532-54.
39. 448 U.S. at 473-91. The MBE set-aside involved in Fullilove required recipients
of federal grants for construction contracts to subcontract at least 10% of the contract
to minority-owned businesses. See 42 U.S.C. § 6705(F)(2) (1982).
40. For an excellent discussion of Fullilove, see generally Note, Minority Business
Enterprise Set-Asides, supra note 6, at 1152-63.
41. 448 U.S. at 473-92.
42. Id. at 473.
43. Id. at 453-67.
44. Id. at 473.
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powers4" to fulfill this goal. The Chief Justice further concluded that
Congress could enact MBE assistance programs that are based on gen-
eral findings of discrimination in the construction industry.46
Chief Justice Burger then examined the means Congress employed.
He stressed that Congress must "narrowly tailor"47 the means to
achieve the desired ends. The Chief Justice found the MBE set-aside
provision in Fulilove to be "tailored" adequately.4" Thus, in various
opinions, seven Justices agreed that the government may impose racial
classifications to remedy the present effects of past discrimination.49
Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion applying the "strict scru-
tiny" analysis he articulated earlier in Bakke. ° Justice Powell's ap-
proach involved a three-part test to determine the constitutionality of a
race-conscious remedy." First, the agency that promulgated a race-
45. Id. at 473-78. To justify regulation of subcontracting practices of nongovern-
mental recipients of federal funds, Chief Justice Burger cited the Article I § 8 commerce
power clause. 448 U.S. at 475 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241 (1964)). The power of Congress to promote interstate commerce permits regu-
lation of beneficiaries of such commerce. To justify regulation of state and local recipi-
ents of federal funds, Chief Justice Burger cited the fourteenth amendment enforcement
power. Chief Justice Burger also interpreted the Public Works Employment Act of
1977 as an exercise of the spending power. 448 U.S. at 475.
46. Id. at 478-79.
47. Id. at 480.
48. Id. at 487-89. The Court found that the program's administrative waiver provi-
sion, short duration, and negligible effect on innocent third parties demonstrated that
the law was "limited to accomplishing the remedial objectives contemplated by Con-
gress. . . ." Id. at 489.
49. Id. at 480 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by White and Powell, J.J.). "Con-
gress may employ racial or ethnic classifications in exercising its... legislative powers
only if those classifications do not violate the equal protection component of the fifth
amendment Due Process Clause." Justice Powell concurred, asserting that "racial clas-
sifications are valid only when they are a necessary means of advancing a compelling
governmental interest." Id. at 496. Justice Marshall also concluded that racial classifi-
cations are acceptable when they benefit minorities previously experiencing discrimina-
tion. Id. at 518 (Marshall, J., joined by Brennan, and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in the
judgment). Justice Stevens, dissenting, rejected a constitutional "prohibition against
any classification based on race." Id. at 548 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Bakke, 438
U.S. 265. There, Justice Powell argued that the "[s]tate has a substantial interest that
legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the
competitive consideration of race." Id. at 320. The Brennan quartet similarly con-
cluded in Bakke that remedial programs could consider racial criteria. Id. at 362-63.
Justice Marshall also interpreted the fourteenth amendment to permit classification by
race. Id. at 396-98. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
50. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 495-517.
51. Id. at 498.
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conscious remedy must have the prescribed authority to do so.5 2 Jus-
tice Powell characterized Congress' authority as "unique"; it clearly
had the power to enact the legislation. Second, the government must
find that past racial discrimination exists in the challenged matter.53
Last, Justice Powell reiterated Chief Justice Burger's position that
Congress must choose means that are narrowly tailored to accomplish
its objective.54 Justice Powell expanded on the Chief Justice's "nar-
rowly tailored" standard and presented the following five factors to
consider when reviewing race-conscious remedies:" the efficacy of al-
ternative remedies;56 the planned duration of the remedy;57 the rela-
tionship between the percentage of minority workers employed by the
program and the percentage of minorities in the relevant work force;58
whether a waiver provision is available in the event the hiring quotas
are out of reach;59 and the effect of the set-aside on innocent third par-
ties." Justice Powell applied these criteria to the set-aside provision
and found the program in Fullilove survived the fourteenth amendment
challenge.6
Justice Marshall articulated the third approach to the equal protec-
tion challenge presented in Fulliove62 Justice Marshall applied an in-
52. Id. Cf Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (Civil Service Com-
mission lacked the authority to bar resident aliens from working in the civil service).
53. 448 U.S. at 498. Justice Powell noted that in Bakke the University failed to
meet either requirement. Because the University's Board of Regents did not prove past
discrimination, they lacked the compelling interest necessary to justify the race con-
scious admissions program. See 438 U.S. at 309-10.
54. 448 U.S. at 498.
55. Id.at5lo-11.
56. Id. at 510. Congress enacted the Public Works Employment Act of 1977 be-
cause previous remedial measures failed to rectify discrimination in the construction
industry. Id. at 511.
57. Id. at 510. The set-aside program terminates when the Act expires. Thus,
"[t]he temporary nature of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not
last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate." Id. at 513.
58. Id. at 510-14. Congress establishes the percentage of minorities participating in
a set-aside program. This percentage is reasonably related to the percentage of minori-
ties in the relevant population. Id. at 513.
59. Id. at 510, 514.
60. Id. A set-aside provision that unjustly burdens nonminority contractors con-
flicts with the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause. Id.
61. Id. at 515.
62. Id. at 517-22 (opinion of Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, J.J.).
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termediate level of scrutiny63 and upheld the MBE set-aside
provision. 64
Although Fullilove furnished several criteria to aid in the evaluation
of affirmative action programs,65 the decision left many issues un-
resolved.66 Because the Court focused on the scope of congressional
power,67 it failed to address whether states may inquire into past dis-
crimination and whether states may enact affirmative action pro-
grams. 68 The importance of Fullilove, then, lies in implying that the
opinions authorize the federal government to implement race-con-
scious remedial programs. Read together, Bakke and Fulliove stand
for the proposition that the Constitution empowers both states69 and
the federal government 70 to consider race when legislating to redress
the effects of prior racial discrimination.
In Ohio Contractors Association v. Kelp,71 the Sixth Circuit 72 re-
viewed a state-authorized MBE set-aside program, and upheld the
63. See id. at 579 (racial classification must be substantially related to an important
legislative goal).
64. Id. See also supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
65. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. 448.
66. The fragmented Fulllove opinion left lower courts without guidance regarding
the proper level of judicial scrutiny to apply in affirmative action cases. But see Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (the holding of a fragmented Court "may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds").
67. See Note, supra note 6, at 1164 n.147.
68. Id. at 1165.
69. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
71. 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983).
72. Courts in several other circuits recently reviewed state authorized affirmative
action programs. See, e.g., Valentine v. Smith, 654 F.2d 503, 507 (8th Cir. 1981) ("The
constitutional guarantee of equal protection does not prohibit states from taking appro-
priate measures to remedy the effects of past discrimination."); Detroit Police Officers
Ass'n, v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 691 (6th Cir. 1979) ("The Constitution imposes on
states the duty to take affirmative steps to eliminate the continuing effects of past uncon-
stitutional discrimination.") (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. I at 15 (1971)); Michigan Road Builders v. Milliken, 571 F. Supp. 173, 178 (E.D.
Mich. 1983) (state representatives, like their congressional counterparts, owe a duty to
their constituents to eliminate the present effects of past discrimination); Central Ala.
Paving, Inc. v. James, 499 F. supp. 629, 638 (M.D. Ala. 1980) (states may inquire into
past discrimination and then may tailor a race-conscious program to remedy the effects
of that discrimination); Southwest Washington Chapter, Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n.
v. Pierce County, 667 P.2d 1092, 1100-02, 100 Wash. 2d 109, 123-28 (1983) (county
affirmative action plan met the requirements of the equal protection clause).
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Ohio MBE Act73 against a fourteenth amendment challenge. The
court of appeals interpreted Justice Powell's reference in Fullilove to
the power of Congress as "unique"'74 as meaning "unequalled," rather
than "exclusive."'75 Supreme Court decisions approving the enforce-
ment of fourteenth amendment provisions by public entities other than
Congress support the Sixth Circuit's interpretation.76
Applying a means-ends analysis, the Sixth Circuit found the state
legislature competent to determine the means necessary to remedy dis-
criminatory practices.7 The court concluded that the Ohio MBE set-
aside program sufficiently safeguarded against restrictive administra-
tion of the Act.78 Ohio Contractors applied Fullilove's rationale up-
holding federal set-asides79 to a state authorized affirmative action
program, thus rejecting the fourteenth amendment challenge.
In South Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of
America, Inc. v. Metropolitan Dade County, Florida,"0 the Eleventh
Circuit reviewed the Bakke and Fullilove opinions and determined that
the Court's concerns in those cases8" applied to the issues in South
Florida. First, the court held that the legislative body involved82 was
authorized to find past discrimination.83 Second, the court noted that
the findings of discrimination supported the need for remedial legisla-
tion.84 Last, the court required that the means adopted to remedy the
effects of discrimination contain sufficient administrative safeguards to
prevent abuse of the program. 5
The South Florida court adopted the Sixth Circuit's interpretation of
Justice Powell's language in Fullilove concerning the "unique" role ac-
73. OHio REv. CODE §§ 122.71, 123.151, 125.081 (1984).
74. See Fulliloye, 448 U.S. at 500.
75. 713 F.2d at 172.
76. See id.
77. Id. at 173.
78. Id. at 174.
79. See supra notes 36-65 and accompanying text.
80. 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 220 (1984).
81. See supra notes 24-71 and accompanying text.
82. The Dade County Commission enacted the program at issue in South Florida,
723 F.2d at 848.
83. Id. at 851.
84. Id. at 851-52.
85. Id. at 852.
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corded Congress,8 6 and concluded that state governments may also en-
act race-conscious remedial legislation87 to ensure equal protection.88
Next, the Eleventh Circuit evaluated the Dade County Commission's
findings of past racial discrimination. 9 The court approved the depth
and accuracy of the Commission's investigation,"° and concluded that
there was a compelling governmental interest justifying the affirmative
action program.9 '
Following these preliminary findings, the Eleventh Circuit turned to
the constitutionality of the program as implemented. First, the court
examined the ordinance's administrative review process and concluded
that the review provisions" assure that the county's program will last
only as long as necessary to achieve its goals.93 Based on its observa-
tions, the court held the ordinance constitutional on its face.94 Second,
the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the set-aside program was
constitutional as applied to a particular government construction pro-
ject for which minority contracts were set aside.95 Applying Powell's
Fullilove analysis,96 the court found that the set-aside and subcontrac-
tor goals were proportionate to the percentage of blacks living in the
county, and were appropriate measures for the project.9 7 The Eleventh
86. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
87. 723 F.2d at 852. See also Michigan Road Builders, 571 F. Supp. at 178 (the
policymaking authority of state legislatures is analagous to that of Congress; state legis-
latures may, therefore, rely on evidence of past discrimination to enact race-conscious
remedial programs).
88. 723 F.2d at 852 (citing Ohio Contractors, 713 F.2d at 172).
89. 723 F.2d at 852.
90. Id. at 853 (citing Dade County, 552 F. Supp. at 925-26).
91. 723 F.2d at 853. The compelling governmental interest lies in reversing the
detrimental effects racism has on opportunities for minority-owned businesses.
92. See supra note 15.
93. 723 F.2d at 853.
94. Id. at 854.
95. Id. at 854-56.
96. Id. at 855 n.l1. See also supra notes 51-62 and accompanying text. Justice
Powell required that the race-conscious remedy be narrowly tailored to achieve the leg-
islature's stated objectives, thereby preventing arbitrary implementation of affirmative
action programs. Justice Powell articulated several factors for courts to consider in
evaluating the constitutionality of affirmative action programs. See supra notes 56-61
and accompanying text.
97. 723 F.2d at 855. The court stressed that the Earlington Heights Station project
accounted for less than 1% of the county's annual contract appropriations, while blacks
make up 17% of the county's population and only 1% of Dade County contractors. See
supra note 12.
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Circuit, therefore, rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the minority set-
aside plan unfairly burdened them.98
South Florida acknowledges the vital nature of a state's interest in
counteracting racial discrimination. Relying on what it perceived as
the concerns expressed in Bakke and Fullilove,99 the Eleventh Circuit
applied Chief Justice Burger's Fullilove opinion"°° to a state authorized
affirmative action program. The Bakke"°1 and Fullilove 0 2 opinions
support the proposition that the Dade County Commission, a non-
Congressional governmental authority, had the power to enact an af-
firmative action program. The court's approval of a state power akin
to the federal power to enact affirmative action programs makes South
Florida important.
South Florida is notable also for its social implications. Increasing
the participation of minority-owned businesses and eradicating present
discrimination through remedial affirmative action programs justifies
the harm suffered by nonminorities. °3 The government's good faith
efforts to rectify the present effects of past racial discrimination are
therefore consistent with equal protection guarantees. This conclusion
survives even if the government enacts race-conscious programs to en-
hance minority participation or to transcend the effects of hidden
racism, io4
The practical impact of South Florida's correct application of Bakke
and Fullilove will provide other states with established procedures for
implementing similar programs. Despite Bakke and Fullilove's ambi-
guities, South Florida provides the source of authority for other states
to increase participation of minority-owned businesses. This guidance
should enhance the states' ability to defeat fourteenth amendment at-
tacks on well-intentioned affirmative action programs.
Michael Rosen
98. 723 F.2d at 856.
99. See id. at 851.
100. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 41-49 and accompanying text.
103. See L. TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1049, (quoting United Jewish Organizations v.
Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 172 n.2 (1977) (opinion of Brennan, J., concurring) (the equitable
use of racial criteria legitimizes consideration of race in remedial programs).
104. See L. TRIBE, supra note 19, at 1052. See also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387-402
(opinion of Marshall, J., dissenting) (discusses the plight of minorities in the United
States since the colonial period).
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